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INTRODUCTION
The American labor market has undergone dramatic changes in
1
the last two decades. Most notably, the high technology market has
created an unpredictable economy whose labor needs are subject to
2
sudden demand as well as the ordinary vicissitudes of the market. As
a matter of sound human resource management and thrifty business
policy, companies have developed ways of dealing strategically with
3
their fluctuating demand for quality labor. The most controversial
of these measures, and the subject of this Comment, is the
employment of temporary staff, or “contingent” workers.
The temporary worker is a familiar part of the employment
landscape. American companies have become increasingly reliant on
their “temps” because they bring comparable skill to the workplace
4
without the accompanying cost.
It is not difficult to see why
employers often prefer to utilize contingent workers instead of
permanent employees. Temporary personnel relieve the company of
its usual obligations: withholding of taxes, overtime pay provisions,
*
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1
Immanuel Ness, Labor’s New Frontier, 4 WORKINGUSA 3, 3 (2001) (listing among
the most significant changes: workers are working longer days; the emergence of the
cyber-workplace; and an increase in non-standard work arrangements, especially the
low-wage temporary employee).
2
Paul Kellogg, Independent Contractor or Employee: Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 35
HOUS. L. REV. 1775, 1802-03 (1999) (discussing the instability inherent to the
computer industry because of the highly competitive software market and the
shifting demands of the consumer).
3
Katherine M. Forster, Strategic Reform of Contingent Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541,
541-42 (2001) (noting that temporary employees generally receive less pay than
regular employees, thus allowing employers to improve profit margins).
4
Id.
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unemployment and workers’ compensation obligations, federal
discrimination provisions, OSHA and state occupational safety
requirements, family and medical leave obligations, and certain
5
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Even an employer
with the best intentions understands that there is a powerful incentive
to cut costs and minimize legal liabilities by using this attractive labor
6
alternative. Additionally, workers who do not have the status of
“employees” are less likely to attempt unionization because the law
often does not recognize the rights of non-employee laborers to
7
bargain collectively.
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
sent shock waves through the employment world with its decision in
8
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation. The Ninth Circuit found that despite
their label as “independent contractors,” the workers were “common
law employees” and thus entitled to the benefits accorded permanent
9
employees.
Vizcaino sparked wide debate over the rights of
10
contingent workers in the integrated workplace, including the right
11
to bargain collectively with the employer. Presently, management
and the contingent workforce generally are at an impasse.
Management asserts that it is its prerogative within the law to meet
12
hiring needs while cutting costs. Contingent workers contend that
they are being exploited when employers retain them beyond a
temporary period and refuse to give them compensation and other
13
benefits equal to their permanent counterparts.
As an extension of the human person, labor can either serve to
5

Susan L. Coskey, Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation; A Labor and Employment
Lawyer’s Perspective, 73 LAB. L.J. 91, 92 (1997).
6
Id. at 92 (suggesting that it is not surprising that contingent employment is
“growing between forty to seventy-five percent faster than employment for the
economy as a whole” because of the “great savings on paper” and the simplicity with
which the employer can expand or reduce its staff).
7
Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board’s Treatment of Temporary
Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (2000)
(discussing the employer’s statutory right under the NLRA to prohibit temporary
workers from joining the collective bargaining unit of regular employees).
8
97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996)
9
Id. at 1195, 1200.
10
“Integrated” in this context indicates a workplace in which permanent
employees and temporary employees work together and are indistinguishable in
terms of duties and responsibilities.
11
See, e.g., Christopher D. Cook, Temps Demand a New Deal, THE NATION, Mar. 27,
2000, at 16 (contrasting attempts by organizations to secure rights for temps with
those of the temp industry, which asserts that the current law supports an employer’s
right to distinguish between classes of workers).
12
Id.
13
Aaron Bernstein, A Leg Up for the Lowly Temp, BUS. WK., June 21, 1999, at 102.
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enhance or denigrate human dignity. Ultimately our labor and
employment laws should be judged by what they contribute to human
dignity and the just social order, not solely by how they aid in the
functioning of a capitalist economy. In short, we need to understand
what the good human life requires, and then strive to shape our laws
accordingly. In the arena of contingent work, this will require a
transformation in our understanding of work and the role it plays in
social life. This Comment ultimately proposes that the issue of
contingent work not only sounds in contract law and economics, but
also in human rights and moral obligation.
The critical framework I will use to evaluate the legal regime
governing contingent employment is derived from well-developed
14
principles of Catholic Social Thought, a body of wisdom reflecting a
certain conception of the human person and the just society. Part I
of this Comment sets forth the major principles of Catholic Social
Thought and their impact on the areas of labor and employment.
Part II outlines the legal background of contingent employment,
including the landmark Vizcaino decision. Part II also analyzes a
recent decision handed down by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) that may expand significantly the collective bargaining rights
of contingent workers.
Finally, Part III critiques these legal
developments using Catholic Social Thought as the standard for
desirable labor and employment laws.
I. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
Scholars generally accept that Catholic Social Thought,
particularly in its American application, has its origin in Pope Leo
15
XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum (The Condition of Labor). The
rise of the secular state, the increasing intellectual influence of
Darwinism, and the Industrial Revolution profoundly transformed
16
Western culture. In the wake of these movements, the laboring
14

See RODGER CHARLES S.J., AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 9
(1999) (identifying Catholic Social Thought as contained in the Scriptures and the
Tradition of the Church).
15
Yet some scholars place the genesis of modern Catholic Social Thought, or
CST, in the eighteenth century. See PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 9
(David A. Boileau ed., 1994) (citing Benedict XIV’s (1740-1758) encyclicals in
response to the Enlightenment and French Revolution as the proper inception of a
systematic Catholic response to social developments).
16
Scholars argue that the Industrial Revolution changed the face of Europe,
though they disagree on whether this change was in the best interest of the West. See
T.B. Macaulay, “Southey’s Colloquies,” in A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION
184-88 (John B. Harrison & Richard E. Sullivan eds., 1967) (arguing generally that
the Industrial Revolution undeniably represented social progress, especially as it
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classes often suffered the effects of low wages, unemployment, and
17
With the publication of Rerum
degrading working conditions.
Novarum, the Church entered the modern debate on the just social
order. This Comment focuses mainly on the Catholic theory of labor.
A. Harmony Between Classes
The Catholic vision of labor relations is not adversarial; it is a
cooperative model based on mutual dependence between employer
18
and employee. While traditional socialist and capitalist theories see
labor and management as mutually antagonistic, Rerum Novarum
articulates a harmony between and among various social groups.
The Church’s metaphor for a well-ordered society is the human
19
body. The health of the entire organism is dependent upon the
20
functioning of the individual parts. No part is inferior to another in
21
that each contributes equally to the well-being of the whole.
Although the analogy is simplistic, it reflects an approach to labor
questions that is markedly different from those adopted in the last
22
two centuries.
The industrial upheavals that began in the
nineteenth century dramatically increased the potential for profit
23
among manufacturers.
The machine would produce as long as
helped to alleviate poverty among the agrarian classes. Macaulay also charged
opponents of the Industrial Revolution with an effete aestheticism that valued
romantic notions of the good life over genuine improvements in people’s lives.). But
see id. See also John L. Hammond & Barbara Hammond, “The Rise of Modern Industry,”
supra, at 206-07 (arguing that increasing industrialization served to deprive people of
civilizing influences and instead enslaved people to the work process:
For the new town [resulting from the Industrial Revolution] was not a
home where man could find beauty, happiness, leisure, learning,
religion – the influences that civilize outlook and habit; but a bare and
desolate place, without colour, air, or laughter, where man, woman,
and child worked, ate, and slept. This was to be the lot of the mass of
mankind . . . . The new factories and the new furnaces were like the
Pyramids, telling of man’s enslavement, rather than of his power . . . .).
17
2 PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1415 (1955).
18
Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (On the Condition of Labor, 1891) 15, reprinted in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 20 (David J. O’Brien &
Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1995) (All references to papal encyclicals hereinafter are
found in this edition unless otherwise noted.)
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
1 FONER, supra note 17, at 69 (noting that the first American trade unions in
the 1790s arose in response to the arrival of the “merchant capitalist” and the
subsequent disintegration of employer/employee cooperation. The two classes thus
became mutually antagonistic).
23
2 id. at 14.
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there was a man or woman to operate it. With profit as their primary
motive in organizing the workplace, managers and owners viewed the
24
workers as simply another factor in the calculus of productivity.
Quite simply, the concepts of labor and capital had merged and the
employee became an instrumentality indistinguishable from the
25
machine he operated.
While traditional Marxism posits that the means to rectify this
26
imbalance of power is by reducing property to common ownership,
the Church reinforces the importance of private property and
suggests that the answer lies not in rearranging schemes of
ownership, but in reintroducing the notion of justice to existing
27
Justice requires the fulfillment of
employment relationships.
agreements equitably made and deference to the dignity of both
28
parties. Specifically, justice calls upon workers to carry out their
contracts, to refrain from destroying capital, to favor amicable
settlements of grievances, to reject violence in representing their
position, to avoid “riot and disorder,” and to disavow contact with
29
those who promise satisfaction but employ dubious means.
Conversely, the employer must recognize that employees are not
indentured servants, that the laboring individual possesses a unique
dignity, that the employee works in order to live a decent and
honorable life, and that workers are never a means by which to make

24

Id. at 14-15 (noting that the rise of industrialism signaled the demise of the
craftsman and the birth of the mass-produced commodity. With the emphasis
shifted from quality to quantity, the worker was no longer needed for his creative
faculties, but for his rather mundane ability to monitor the machine).
25
Karl Marx offers one of the most penetrating analyses of work and man in the
modern age, particularly the potential for work to dehumanize the person as he
devotes ever more of himself to material production:
The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the more
his production increases in power and extent. The worker becomes an
ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces . . . .
Labor not only produces commodities; it also produces itself and the
workers as a commodity and it does so in the same proportion in which it
produces commodities in general.
KARL MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 323-34 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans.).
Marx correlates directly the objectification of man as an instrumentality with
society’s increased capacity for production. Id. Explosive economic growth such as
that witnessed during the Industrial Revolution often follows innovations in
technology. Id. If periods of technological transformation pose the greatest threat
to working conditions, as Marx seems to suggest, then perhaps it is not surprising
that the contingent worker situation should arise out of the current high-tech arena.
26
KARL MARX, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 878, 889 (Steven Cahn ed., 1990).
27
Rerum Novarum 16, supra note 18, at 21.
28
Id.
29
Id.
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30

money at any expense. Most significantly, the Church proffers an
elevated vision of workers, one that views people not as a product of
what they do for a living, but as beings of depth who require
31
fulfillment on a “spiritual and mental” level. Justice recognizes that
both labor and management have their own priorities, and calls upon
each side to advance its goals in a way consistent with the dignity of
32
all persons.
B. Dignity of Labor
33

The Catholic philosophy of labor is comprehensive.
It
acknowledges that work is a phenomenon common to all of
34
humanity, whether one occupies the position of employer or
35
employee. It is also pragmatic in its recognition that management
36
usually possesses greater wealth and material resources. As such,
workers are generally in a weaker position to alter working conditions
30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
DAVID HOLLENBACH, JUSTICE, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICAN CATHOLIC
SOCIAL ETHICS IN A PLURALISTIC CONTEXT 38-39 (discussing how Catholic labor
theory, particularly as contained in John Paul II’s encyclical Laborem Exercens, ranges
from concern for individual human fulfillment at work to the threat posed by labor
distribution on the international level). John Paul II describes the depth and
breadth of work in the human condition in Laborem Exercens: “[M]an’s life is built up
every day from work, from work it derives its specific dignity, but at the same time
work contains the unceasing measure of human toil and suffering, and also of the
harm and injustice which penetrate deeply into social life within individual nations
and on the international level.” Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens (On Human
Work, 1981) 1, at 352.
34
John Paul outlines the distinctiveness of labor in the created order and its
position as something unique to humanity and not shared with any other form of
life: “Man is made to be in the visible universe an image and likeness of God himself,
and he is placed in it in order to subdue the earth. From the beginning therefore he
is called to work. Work is one of the characteristics that distinguish man from the rest of the
creatures, whose activity for sustaining their lives cannot be called work . . . . Thus
work bears a particular mark of man and of humanity, the mark of a person
operating within a community of persons.” Introduction to Laborem Exercens, supra note
33, at 352.
35
HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 41 (noting that “[t]he human person is the
image of God partly through the mandate received from the creator to subdue, to
dominate, the earth. In carrying out this mandate, humankind, every human being,
reflects the very action of the creator of the universe.”) (emphasis added).
36
Catholic Social Thought acknowledges that the systematic response of the
Church beginning with Rerum Novarum was justified under “principles of social
morality.” Liberalism, as embodied by the capitalist economic system, “strengthened
and safeguarded economic initiative by the possessor of capital alone, but did not
pay sufficient attention to the rights of the workers . . . .” Rerum Novarum 8, supra
note 18, at 362. This reality in turn gave rise to worker solidarity movements as a
means of balancing the respective rights of labor and management.
31
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set up by the employer who can simply replace objecting employees.
Absent any real influence in the employment relationship, the worker
has no choice but to subject himself to the vagaries and indignities of
the marketplace. But Rerum Novarum opposes this proposition with
the bedrock principle of its labor proposal; namely, that all work is
dignified because “the true dignity and excellence of man lies in his
moral qualities, that is, in virtue; that virtue is the common
inheritance of all, equally within the reach of high and low, rich and
38
poor . . . .” Pope Leo XIII grounds his assertion that all work has
39
Christ himself chose to realize the
dignity in Christology.

37

MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS MATTER 10 (1998).
Rerum Novarum 20, supra note 18, at 23.
39
Id. “Christology” is the study of the nature of Christ, particularly with regard to
what his life can tell us about how human life is to be lived and what the attributes of
a just society are. See The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System, discussing the
Christian belief in Christ as more than symbolic:
By the act of coming into the world as a human being, Christ fully
identified himself with those for whom he came . . . . He constituted
himself as the unsurpassable symbol by all the mysteries of his life,
including, climactically, his passion, death, and risen life. In the
earthly ministry of Jesus each major event gives a further enrichment to
his humanity and consequently to our ability to perceive him as God’s
definitive self-disclosure.
AVERY DULLES S.J., THE CRAFT OF THEOLOGY: FROM SYMBOL TO SYSTEM 27 (1992); see
also RICHARD P. MCBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 493 (1994) (identifying a distinction between
Christology “from below” and Christology “from above.” The former emphasizes the
“Jesus of history, a human being like us in all things except sin, who stands out from
the rest of the human race by his proclamation of, and commitment to, the
Kingdom, or reign, of God.” The latter “begins with the preexistent Word of God in
heaven, who ‘comes down’ to earth to take on human flesh and redeem us by dying
on the cross, rising from the dead, and returning to enjoy an exalted state as Lord in
heaven.”). Id.
The essence of this idea is captured well in the encyclical Redemptor Hominis:
God entered the history of humanity and, as a man, became an actor in
that history, one of the thousands of millions of human beings but at
the same time Unique! Through the Incarnation God gave human life
the dimension that he intended man to have from his first beginning;
he has granted that dimension definitively – in the way that is peculiar
to him alone . . . .
Pope John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis (The Redeemer of Man, 1979) 1.2, reprinted in THE
ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II 46-47 (J. Michael Miller C.S.B. ed., 1996).
According to Christian belief, therefore, the historical Jesus as portrayed in the
New Testament is a source of moral and ethical wisdom. The Incarnation, the act of
God assuming human form while also retaining His divine nature, was a profound
act of love because it gave humanity God in its midst. No longer simply the object of
philosophical speculation, God in the person of Jesus experiences the human
condition fully, ultimately rises above its travails, and fulfills his temporal purpose.
As such, the historical Jesus is not only to be studied, but emulated. See CATECHISM
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, at 471 § 1694.
38
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Incarnation—the act of becoming human—as a carpenter, a
profession associated with common origins and the working class.
The significance of Christ as carpenter to labor theory lies in its
intimation that dignity is a function of our common humanity and
41
not the particular profession in which we are engaged. It suggests
42
that any just employment relationship will be radically egalitarian —
it will treat both sides as equally deserving of just treatment regardless
43
of who is in a position of greater wealth or power.
C. Work is Not Humankind’s Ultimate Purpose
Catholic Social Thought squarely rejects the tendency of
modern society to view work as an end unto itself, subordinating
other concerns to it, and demanding that we order our other
44
priorities to it. Work is instead relegated to the status of a means to
45
the final end, which is God.
In Catholic theology, humankind
46
originates in God and receives its nature from God. By this nature,
40

Mark 6:2-3.
See CHARLES, supra note 14, at 63, stating:
Work has been given a new dignity by the example of God the Son
made man, who spent most of his life on earth working with his hands
for a living . . . . All honest work is ennobled in that it is man, made in
God’s image and likeness, who does it. The subject of work is more
important than the work done or the object achieved by it.
42
The egalitarian ideal refers to the equal dignity of all people before God. It
thus provides a basis for ensuring that both employer and employee treat each other
fairly in establishing their working arrangement. It is not, as the Marxist notion
seems to suggest, an assertion that distinctions among people are inherently unjust
(e.g. rich/poor, employer/employee). The Catholic vision thus does not object to
the notion of class, but insists on the equal worth of all people.
43
National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter
on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy 302, at 648 (United States Catholic
Conference, 1986). The bishops of the United States have called for “ new patterns
of partnership” in the workplace in order to ensure that workers and management
receive just treatment:
Partnerships between labor and management are possible only when
both groups possess real freedom and power to influence decisions.
This means that unions ought to continue to play an important role in
moving toward greater economic participation within firms and
industries . . . . For partnership to be genuine it must be a two-way
street, with creative initiative and a willingness to cooperate on all sides.
Id. Gould argues that such employee participation initiatives on a global scale
are a major factor in the impending transformation in labor-management
industrial relations. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 109
(1993).
44
Rerum Novarum 32, supra note 18, at 29.
45
Id.
46
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 11-12 (Paul E. Sigmund ed.,
1988).
41
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human beings hold as their ultimate goal the return to the source of
47
their creation. During their lives on earth, men and women use
their work as one means “to that attainment of truth and that practice
48
of goodness in which the full life of the soul consists.” By virtue of
his creation, each person is vested with an inviolable dignity that
49
directs man back to God as his ultimate end. Man’s work, therefore,
must do nothing to impugn that dignity and thereby impede man in
50
the fulfillment of his final purpose. The Church states emphatically
its opposition to a social order that permits its citizens to live in an
51
oppressive culture of work.
Indeed, Rerum Novarum dismisses the
contention that the employment relationship is essentially a
contractual one that simply reflects the acceptance by both parties of
52
its terms and conditions. The individual has no right to enter into
contracts, however voluntary, that are “calculated to defeat the end
53
and purpose of his being.”
This proposition stands in stark contrast to the classical theory of
contract law that once governed American employment law
54
jurisprudence. At the turn of the last century, the United States
Supreme Court was loathe to interfere with the contractual
relationship absent clear evidence of a State’s legitimate police

47

JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 15 (John J. Fitzgerald
trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1947).
48
Rerum Novarum 32, supra note 18, at 29.
49
Redemptor Hominis 11.2, supra note 39, at 60. (Redemptor Hominis describes this
return to God as the “single goal to which is directed the deepest aspiration of the
human spirit.” By virtue of this aspiration, the human person is necessarily on a
quest for “the full dimension of its humanity . . . the full meaning of human life.”).
50
Rerum Novarum 16, supra note 18, at 20-21.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 31.
53
Id. at 32, at 29. (noting, for example, that such contracts would include those
requiring work on Sundays, those requiring such excessive labor that they effectively
treat the employee as an instrumentality, and any contracts not allowing for “proper
rest for soul and body”).
54
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding
unconstitutional a New York law setting maximum hours that bakers could work:
“The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer
and employees . . . . The general right to make a contract in relation to his business
is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.”). Chemerinsky notes that in Lochner the Court articulated the
following three major principles: 1) Freedom of contract is a basic right protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) Government may interfere with the freedom
of contract only to advance a valid police purpose, such as public safety, public
health, or public morals; 3) The role of the Court is to “carefully scrutinize”
legislation that hinders the freedom of contract. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2.2 (1997).
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55

power.
The contract represented the agreement of autonomous
beings who were free to create whatever conditions suited their
56
respective needs. It was not the province of the state generally to
regulate even gross inequities in the resulting terms of the contract,
57
unless such regulation was consistent with a state’s police power.
The prevailing laissez-faire philosophy of the day claimed to respect
deeply man’s freedom to contract and therefore refused to regulate
58
the products of this freedom. Against this backdrop, the Church’s
view of the nature of contract represents a radical departure.
Parties to an employment contract are bound not only by the
59
precepts of human law, but also by the demands of the divine law.
While traditional contract law allowed man to accept onerous terms if
he perceived that the resulting advantage was commensurate, the
divine law denied man the right to accept such terms if they adversely
60
affected his obligation to God. In strong language the encyclical
asserts that the employee has no power whatsoever to consent to
61
treatment that violates his dignity in the eyes of God:
To consent to any treatment which is calculated to defeat the end
and purpose of his being is beyond his rights; he cannot give up

55

See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-54. In the thirty years following Lochner, the Court
struck down numerous social welfare laws. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (declaring unconstitutional laws
that prohibited employers from requiring that employees not join a union); Adkins
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional a law that set a
minimum wage for women); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (declaring
unconstitutional a law that prohibited private employment agencies from charging a
fee to employees).
56
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
57
Id. at 53-54.
58
SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE 140-41 (1964)
(noting that the post-Civil War Supreme Court practiced a laissez-faire judicial
philosophy in order to circumscribe the reach of social welfare legislation.). The
author also traces the evolution of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from “[b]road interpretations of liberty and property . . . [to] the
derivative right of liberty of contract.” Id. The effect of the Court’s purported
reverence for the freedom of contract was to seriously hinder the enactment of
progressive social legislation. Id. at 164. In a coy assessment of the legal
consequences of laissez-faire jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound wrote:
Today, when [the judiciary] assumes to stand between the legislature
and the public and thus again to protect the individual from the state,
it really stands between the public and what the public needs and
desires, and protects individuals who need no protection against
society which does need it.
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 403 (1908).
59
Rerum Novarum, supra note 18, at 46.
60
Id. at 29.
61
Id.
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his soul to servitude; for it is not man’s own rights which are here
62
in question, but the rights of God, most sacred and inviolable.

It follows then that Catholic Social Thought will give this admonition
meaning by defining in greater detail what constitutes the “end and
purpose of being” and the “rights of God.” The nature and purpose
of human life thus gives rise to certain non-waivable protections.
Most significant, however, is the articulation of a standard that must
govern the relationship between employer and employee. This
standard is independent of any human law, country, or culture. Yet it
is universal in its obligation and invites man-made law to participate
in its goals and reflect its priorities in its own codes.
D. Just Wages
In determining the all-important question of the just wage,
Catholic Social Thought once again takes issue with pure contract
63
law. Under contract analysis, employer and employee agree to a
certain level of compensation and injustice occurs only when the
64
employer fails to pay or the employee refuses to work. In Catholic
Social Thought, the wage represents more than the agreed-to
compensation. Rerum Novarum suggests that labor has a dual nature:
1) personal—the worker chooses to sell his labor in exchange for some
kind of personal profit; and 2) necessary—the worker labors in order
65
to live. Man must work in order to sustain his very existence. Our
society tends to view the employee’s wage as a function of the
66
personal aspect alone. As a personal concern, a working person is
free to “accept any rate of wages whatever; for in the same way as he is
free to work or not, so he is free to accept a small wage or even none
67
at all.” But the Church insists that work is also necessary, which
compels us to look beyond the wage quoted in the contract to see if it
68
permits the worker to live in human dignity. The Church does not
62

Id.
Id. at 31.
64
Id.
65
Rerum Novarum, supra note 18, at 31.
66
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Temporary Workers Seeking Code of Conduct for Job
Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at B1 (discussing the objection of temporary work
agencies to industry-wide standards in the context of wages and benefits. Agencies
assert that such standards “like health insurance and a so-called living wage are
unrealistically expensive.”). Simply stated, the employer offers a wage and the
employee accepts. There is little concern for what standard of living this wage
provides or how useful the wage is in effecting certain fundamental rights such as
health care.
67
Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31.
68
CHARLES, supra note 14, at 81 (noting that in a free society wages must rely on
63
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deny that free negotiation is a prerequisite to the establishment of a
just wage, yet it reminds us that
there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient
than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration
must be enough to support the wage earner in reasonable and
frugal comfort . . . if through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the
workman accepts harder conditions because an employer will give
69
him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice.

As Patricia Ann Lamoureux has observed, Leo XIII framed the
question of just remuneration in terms of the right to live in dignity,
and this important step moved the issue “beyond free consent . . . to
70
the level of justice in the relationship between two persons.”
Interestingly, Catholic Social Thought does not look to the State to
71
remedy such injustices directly. Rather it calls upon the State to
free agreement between parties, but at the same time society has a duty to ensure
that prevailing wages are sufficient to meet human needs).
69
Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31.
70
Patricia Ann Lamoureux, Justice for Wage Earners, HORIZONS (2001), at 213.
71
The Catholic position on the role of the State has steadily evolved from Rerum
Novarum through Laborem Exercens while maintaining certain principles consistently.
Consistent with its concern for the common good and its encouragement of
communal action to remedy societal ills, the Church does not reject the potential
power of the State to ensure that proper standards of individual well-being are
maintained. See A. Rauscher, Institutions of Social Organization: Family, Private Property,
State, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 82 (David A. Boileau ed., 1994).
Thus Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum places the primary onus on the State to “make sure
that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the
commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and
private prosperity . . . for it is the province of the commonwealth to consult for the
common good.” Rerum Novarum 26, supra note 18, at 26. This rather beneficent
conception of the State would be profoundly challenged in the next century
following the horrors of National Socialism and Stalinism. With the publication of
the encyclical Centesimus Annus in 1991 to mark the centenary of Rerum Novarum,
John Paul II articulates a more ambiguous role for the State. See J. Verstraeten,
Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 145 (David A.
Boileau ed., 1994) (noting that while John Paul II supports some state involvement
in providing security for society, excessive dependence on the state creates a “loss of
human energy and the exaggerated increase of governmental apparatus . . . .”). The
State has the responsibility to encourage the national economy and thereby create
gainful employment. It also occupies a position as defender of the most vulnerable
in society. Yet as J. Bryan Hehir has commented, these affirmative duties are
tempered by a concern that the State vested with excessive powers tends to
totalitarianism. See J. Bryan Hehir, Reordering the World, in A NEW WORLDLY ORDER:
JOHN PAUL II AND HUMAN FREEDOM 88 (George Weigel ed., 1992). Therefore
Centesimus Annus “espouse[s] an activist state, but one constrained by the principle of
subsidiarity.” Id. Hehir also observes that John Paul II has added a critique of “the
welfare state” which is new to Catholic Social Thought. Id. The Pope cautions that
even a State motivated by good intentions in providing for the basic needs of its
citizens can become an undesirable behemoth. In a re-emphasis of the importance
of community-based responses to individual need, Centesimus prefers voluntary
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protect the right of workers to respond collectively to workplace
conditions. The distinction is a subtle one since it would be difficult
for workers to exercise rights in the workplace without the state
extending legal sanction to their activity. It is desirable for the state
to construct a legal regime supportive of worker-management
cooperation, but undesirable for it to oversee the specific terms of
every employment contract. Throughout Catholic Social Thought
there is a tension between the individual and the state. While it is
recognized that in some areas intimate state involvement may be
essential to achieving social goals, there is a corresponding concern
that the state may also become the sole agent in social life, thus
minimizing the importance of the individual. Integral to Catholic
Social Thought’s philosophy of labor is the contribution of unions
and other similar associations before government involvement, and
72
the requirement that the state not work to undermine these groups.
E. Unions/Workers’ Associations
Common to Catholic Social Thought is the notion that social
problems are best resolved using the resources of smaller,
73
74
community-based organizations.
This principle of subsidiarity
associations to a government bureaucracy when providing for the public welfare. Id.
For a comprehensive consideration of Catholic Social Thought and entitlements, see
Symposium on Entitlements, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 419-793 (1997).
72
Rerum Novarum 38, supra note 18, at 33.
73
David L. Gregory, Dorothy Day’s Lessons for the Transformation of Work, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57, 98-99 (1996).
74
From the Latin subsidium meaning “help,” subsidiarity is a central concept of
Catholic Social Thought. In one sense it is the cognate of “welfare” in the secular
system. Both ideas refer to the means by which a society provides temporary
assistance to those in need. Subsidiarity, however, acknowledges first that as an
independent being vested with natural rights, man is endowed with the capacity for
self-direction and autonomy. See CATECHISM supra note 39, at § 1730. Yet this
independence does not call for man to live an insular existence, incapable of
solidarity with others. See CHARLES supra note 14, at 35. Although individual selfsufficiency is a requirement for the common good, solidarity with others mandates
that as a society we assist “persons, families, and intermediate societies . . . when they
need it.” Id. Dorothy Day, the social justice advocate, premised the mission of The
Catholic Worker, an organization in service of the poor and oppressed, on subsidiarity:
We advocate . . . [a] decentralized society in contrast to the present
bigness of government, industry, education, health care, and
agriculture. We encourage efforts such as . . . worker ownership and
management of small factories . . . any effort in which money can once
more become merely a medium of exchange, and human beings are
no longer commodities.
Gregory, supra note 73, at 98.
Wolfe makes a persuasive argument that subsidiarity is consonant with the
American tradition of limited government. See Christopher Wolfe, Subsidiarity: The
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reflects the view that communities have a better understanding of
their own deficiencies and therefore are more capable of effecting a
75
just resolution than a larger, more bureaucratic entity.
The
community is large enough to exercise coercive power over members
not acting to promote the common good, yet small enough to instill
76
virtuous habits in its individual members. The State, on the other
“Other” Ground of Limited Government, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND
COMMUNITARIANISM 81 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995). Unlike the American
notion of limited government, however, subsidiarity is not based on a fear that
“higher political authorities will abuse their power.” Id. at 87. Wolfe suggests that
the theoretical foundation for subsidiarity is “deeper” and “more principled”—it
reflects the Church’s teaching that people, not things, are the fundamental building
blocks of society. Id. Therefore, people acting for the common good, not a
bureaucratic entity, should bear the responsibility for the needy in their midst.
75
See Gregory Baum, Liberal Capitalism, in THE LOGIC OF SOLIDARITY 80 (Gregory
Baum & Robert Ellsberg eds., 1989) (positing that subsidiarity seeks “a balance
between the freedom of small enterprises and the government’s responsibility for the
well-being of all”).
76
Communities are premised on a conception of the common good; that is, what
is in the best interest of the group. See YVES R. SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF
AUTHORITY 31-32 (1962). In a symbiotic manner, the individual contributes to the
health of the community and the community enables man to flourish in his social
capacity. See Michael Novak, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 32 (1989)
(proposing that the apparent tension between the individual and the community is
often slight since they are not fundamentally contradictory: “When a human person
acts with reflection and choice – acts, that is, as a person – the personal good and the
common good tend to coincide”). An important aspect of community is the
individual members’ adherence to agreed-upon norms of conduct. A serious
challenge to the concept of community, therefore, is one branch of modern liberal
political theory that views community as a collection of discrete persons pursuing
their individual ends with minimal state interference in these personally-determined
priorities. See Kenneth L. Grasso, Beyond Liberalism: Human Dignity, the Free Society, and
the Second Vatican Council, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM 45-46
(Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995). But see MARITAIN, supra note 47, at 49-51
(proposing that the goal of society can be neither the satisfaction of individual good
nor the satisfaction of the collection of individual goods, as discussed above).
Maritain posits that both of these proposals would be destructive of society, since it
would result in an “anarchistic conception of individualistic materialism in which the
whole function of the city is to safeguard the liberty of each; thus giving to the strong
full freedom to oppress the weak.” Id. at 50. Rather, he suggests, the “common good
of [society] is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a
whole which . . . relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. Id. at 5051. It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their
communion in good living. It is therefore common to both the whole and the parts . . .
.” Id. at 50. Maritain’s words are in direct opposition to the modern individualist
conception of society. Grasso, supra note 76, at 45. A related concern and a vexing
difficulty with theories of community in general is the justification of coercion over
individuals to encourage ethical behavior; that is, conduct promoting the good of the
whole. The proper exercise of authority in political associations receives early
treatment by Aristotle in Book 3 of THE POLITICS. The issue persists in the present
day among political theorists. See ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 150-52
(discussing a community’s need to explicitly distinguish virtues from vices in order to
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hand, is relatively aloof from the lives of the people. As a result of
this distance, it is unable to appreciate fully the life of the community
and so less suited to forging solutions tailored to the unique
78
circumstances of those people. Catholic Social Thought does not
deny that the State may attempt in good faith to rectify social ills in a
particular community, but it prefers a response from the affected
community. Such local responses have normative force and thus are
more likely to be sustainable. There is less assurance that the State’s
response will have the same legitimacy among individuals in the
community. In addition, the State exercises extensive coercive power
while remaining virtually incapable of instilling virtuous habits in the
79
citizenry. When the State remedies a situation, it essentially imposes
a solution, thus denying those affected a meaningful role in crafting

determine what actions are destructive of community. In this way the community
establishes moral and ethical norms, thus justifying coercive action over individuals
not acting in the common good). See also the classic study of the nature of coercion
in political society in YVES R. SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF AUTHORITY (1962). The
labor union may also be viewed as a community established to achieve a common
objective and maintain rules of conduct for individual members. Like political
communities, unions embody the tension between individual self-fulfillment and
community well-being. The marked rise of individualism, scholars argue, is related
to the decline in American civic organizations such as churches, political clubs, and
neighborhoods. See, e.g., Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions As Seedbeds of
the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 290-91 (1995). The decline in unionism can also
be traced to the prevailing individualist sentiment. See Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The
Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism As a Cause For Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 134 (1998) (noting that “Americans are not attracted to
unionization because they are increasingly inhospitable to collective action.
Individualism has come to dominate American social structure and thought. The
traditional labor organization is based on an opposing ideology of mutual aid and
support, in which individual interests yield to group interests . . . .”).
77
HENRY TAM, COMMUNITARIANISM 144 (1988) (describing the alienation of
individuals engendered by modern political systems: “Conventional politics . . . take
the marginalization of citizens for granted. Political decisions are taken by the state,
and the citizens are at best given a periodic vote . . . .”).
78
Id. at 156 (arguing that communitarian forms of governance prevent political
decisions that are ill-suited to local needs by “avoiding the imposition of
authoritarian visions”). Communitarianism thus calls for more decentralized forms
of government. Id. at 157.
79
As Kenneth L. Grasso has noted, modern liberalism may be the political system
least able to organize society around a conception of the common good. Grasso,
supra note 76, at 46 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995). The concept of subjective
preference, which is fundamental to liberalism, prohibits any “substantive
conception of the good life.” Id. at 45. Because such a conception would be simply
one “subjective preference” among others, liberalism would be loathe to value one
preference over another. Id. Rather than articulate a conception of the human
good for all, liberalism allows each person to determine subjectively his own private
good. Id. at 46. The coercive power of the state, therefore, operates only to ensure
that each person remains free to pursue his own private good. Id.
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80

an alternative resolution. The proper role of the State is to protect
its citizens and ensure that a just social order, defined by the people,
81
is maintained.
Similarly, in the relationship between employer and employee,
82
State interference should be kept to a minimum. Disagreements
that arise—hours of work, working conditions, wages—should be
resolved at the level of employer/employee through those smaller
83
organizations representing the interests of both groups.
Just as
human beings naturally form families and communities to meet their
various physical, emotional, and spiritual needs, workers form
84
associations of people engaged in similar trades to meet their needs.
Workers’ associations, or unions, are fundamental not only to
securing rights for working people, but also to the flourishing of
85
culture and advancement of knowledge.
This is so because,
inevitably, human beings accomplish more as societies than they do
86
Individuals have a “natural right” to associate in
as individuals.
87
groups, and the same principle that causes men to form a civil
88
society also causes them to form unions. Therefore, if the State
prohibits workers from forming unions, “it contradicts the very
principle of its own existence; for both [a union] and the State exist
in virtue of the same principle, viz., the natural propensity of man to
89
live in society.”
An interesting question is raised, however, when the State does
not actively prohibit collective action by workers, but simply does not
substantiate it. In other words, does the State have an affirmative
80

TAM, supra note 77, at 144.
Rerum Novarum 26, supra note 18, at 26.
82
Id. at 34, at 31.
83
Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380.
84
Id. at 36.
85
Id.
86
MARITAIN, supra note 47, at 48 (“[The person seeks to live in society because]
unless it is integrated in a body of social communications, it cannot attain the
fullness of its life and accomplishment . . . . It is not by itself alone that it reaches its
plenitude but by receiving essential goods from society.”).
87
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 6 (Carnes Lord ed., 1984).
88
Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 727, 730-33 (positing that collective bargaining arises directly out of the classical
notion that “the primary function of community is to assist the full development and
proper unfolding of the human personality . . . .”).
89
Id. The notion of man as a social being naturally drawn to communitybuilding and acting in concert with others for better living was first meaningfully
articulated by Aristotle and strongly emphasized in the political theory of Aquinas,
the philosopher credited with providing the intellectual and theological foundation
for Catholic Social Thought.
81

2003

COMMENT

657

duty to promote unions? While the State may not be morally
obligated to advocate union activity, it should be careful that its
neutrality does not effectively hinder such activity either. In this
regard, Part II.B addresses how the joint employer doctrine has
served to deny contingent employees the rights of representation
contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act.
F. Laborem Exercens and the Philosophy of Work
In 1981, ninety years after the release of Rerum Novarum, John
Paul II thoroughly reviewed the Catholic theory of labor and added
his own insights to labor in the postmodern world in the encyclical
90
Laborem Exercens (On Human Work). Laborem Exercens represents an
exploration into the nature of work that is more subtle and
theological than Rerum Novarum. It recognizes that work in the
modern world plays an even more prominent role than it once did.
It is not enough, John Paul argues, to view work as a necessary evil
and merely ensure that a decent wage and satisfactory working
91
conditions prevail.
Laborem Exercens creates a “gospel of work,”
giving human toil a theological significance and a vital role in the
92
self-realization of the human person. The Church acknowledges
that as human civilizations and cultures have progressed, the notion
93
of work has also evolved. There is an urgent need “for the discovery
94
of the new meanings of human work.” More specifically, it must be
determined whether the legal and social structures we use to define
work promote just relationships between individuals and therefore
95
harmony among the various social strata.
96
Work is a profound dimension in the life of an individual. It
occupies a significant portion of our daily lives, it defines our
“station” in society, and it is largely determinative of the lifestyle we
97
choose to adopt.
In Catholic Social Thought, work derives its
90

Laborem Exercens, supra note 33, at 352.
Early in the encyclical, John Paul describes work as “the key to the social
question” and asserts that the nature of human work is an important aspect of
“making life more human.” Id. at 3, at 355. Work is invested with a deeply
theological significance. Id.
92
Id. at 25, at 386.
93
Id. at 2, at 353-54.
94
Id. at 354.
95
Id. at 1, at 353.
96
ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 65-66 (1985) (arguing that at
its deepest, work is morally inseparable from one’s life. “It subsumes the self into a
community of disciplined practice and sound judgment whose activity has meaning
and value in itself . . . .”).
97
Id.
91
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98

profundity from Biblical sources. After all, the very existence of
99
creation is a result of God’s “labor” over a six-day period. Following
the creation of human beings, God passed along responsibility for
further creation in his admonition that humanity is to “fill the earth
100
and subdue it.” In one sense, then, Genesis is essentially about the
divine mandate for man to be active in the world, to transform nature
101
through his work into a place reflective of God’s will.
This is a
direct call, therefore, for a culture of work that enhances human
dignity, strives for a just social order, and places a concern for man’s
well-being at the center of the process. In other words, it is focused
on the worker, not on the end result of work.
Laborem Exercens elaborates on a theory of work that emphasizes
102
two fundamental dimensions: objective and subjective.
Work is
defined as a “transitive” activity, which indicates that an act of labor
starts with the human subject and ends with the desired effect on an
103
object.
This distinction assumes vital significance because, as the
creation of God vested with supreme importance, man as the subject
of work is the measuring stick against which any labor theory is
104
measured. The effect which any employment law or practice has on
the objective aspect of work, namely profits, is of secondary
98

HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 39.
Genesis, 1:1-31.
100
Laborem Exercens 4, supra note 33, at 356.
101
HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 41.
102
Laborem Exercens, supra note 5, at 357-60.
103
Id. at 4, at 356.
104
As Neuhaus observes, man as the measure of theory is a common theme in
John Paul II’s writings, particularly in Centesimus Annus. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS,
DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: THE CHALLENGE TO THE CHRISTIAN CAPITALIST 182
(1992). Since his days as a student of Edmund Husserl, John Paul adhered to the
teaching of phenomenology, “a philosophy that is determined to attend not so much
to grand principles as to the structures and patterns of behavior by which people
think and act.” Id. at 181-82. Phenomenology is a realist philosophy in the sense
that it places man in historical time with all his imperfections and shortcomings. Id.
at 182. Perhaps in response to his own experiences under Communism in Poland,
John Paul II’s thought opposes the socialist objectification of man and resists its
reduction of man from individual to mere instrument of the State. Id. With the
encyclicals of John Paul II, injected into Catholic thought is a vibrant philosophy of
“person as actor.” Id. There is a renewed emphasis on “man as subject;” no longer is
he the passive object of action, but the creative initiator. Man’s conscious perception
of his environment becomes important because he is not a cog in the machine. As
the being vested with the highest dignity and intelligence, he is called to a life of
intimate participation with God in the world of creation. HOLLENBACH, supra note
33, at 41. Therefore man as subject must not be alienated from this creative process
of work, but feel integrated with it. As work assumes an ever greater role in our
society, it may be that labor theory and employment practices will provide the most
significant opportunity to build a more human way of life.
99
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105

G. Objective Nature of Work
The objective element of work is the technology used to
106
accomplish the task and the products that result. It is the process
through which nature is transformed to meet the needs of
107
humanity.
Man applies his intellectual and physical powers, for
example, to devise ways of turning resources into productive sources
of energy, food, or clothing. This may involve processes of growing
plants, extracting minerals, or altering natural resources through the
108
manufacturing process into items useful to human consumption.
Throughout history these processes have become less labor-intensive
because sophisticated technology in the form of machines now
109
accomplishes many of the tasks once performed by human workers.
The danger in this continued refinement of the objective aspect of
work is that man becomes an increasingly insignificant factor in the
110
calculus of labor, technology, and productivity.
Even the current
economy’s increased emphasis on human capital has not rendered
these concerns obsolete. The rise of the employee-driven service
economy has not necessarily resulted in increased job security or
worker contentment. This danger did not end with the Industrial
Revolution, but remains with us as technology and work generally
111
have become even more sophisticated. John Paul II suggests that in
light of the dramatic changes in the post-industrial environment,
there is a need once again for “reproposing in new ways the question

105

HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 38.
Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 357.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
This phenomenon of the “displaced worker” is one of the most contentious
issues in labor law. Technological change and its accompanying efficiency often
eliminate jobs. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO?
169-70 (1984). The response of organized labor to high-tech advances in the
workplace has been varied. Id. Acknowledging that this may be perceived as against
social progress, some unions support the continuing evolution of the workplace. Id.
The difficulty arises, however, as unions attempt to support such changes while
vigorously advocating job protection for their members. Id.
110
Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 357.
111
For a contemporary illustration of how increasing technological sophistication
continues to adversely affect the wages and conditions of workers, see Organizing
High-Tech Permatemps in the Pacific Northwest: Interview with Barbara Judd, 4
WORKINGUSA 100, 100-13 (2000-2001) (discussing the formation of WashTech, an
association formed to organize workers employed in the technology industry of
Washington State).
106
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112

of human work.”
This consideration suggests the restoration of
man, particularly in this age of mechanization, as “the proper subject
113
of work.”
H. Subjective Nature of Work
The subjective element of work is concerned with man’s action
as he engages in the work process and what meaning work has for the
114
person doing it.
Beyond the objective results achieved by these
actions (“finishing the job”), a subjective view of work requires that in
115
doing his job, man’s actions help him “to realize his humanity.”
Work is deeply related to the essential process of self-realization,
whereby an individual becomes conscious of his freedom, his
116
rationality, and his capacity for volition.
Remarkably, it holds that
man has a right to expect his work to be fulfilling in the deepest
117
sense.
Laborem Exercens specifically outlines what is necessary for the
individual to achieve this important subjective satisfaction in the
118
workplace. John Paul II cautions from the outset that an employee
is not only concerned with the salary he receives for the work he
119
performs.
The employee needs more than simply remuneration.
Most importantly, a worker needs to feel a sense of ownership; that is,
120
he must at some level truly believe that he is working “for himself.”
112

Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 357.
Id.
114
Neuhaus captures the meaning of “subjectivity” well. NEUHAUS, supra note 104,
at 24. He argues that a theory taking into account the subjective nature of the
human person is one that fits ideas to man and not vice versa: “[O]ur thinking about
economics must attend to real, concrete human beings and how they behave. Not
just how we think they should behave, but how they actually do behave. Real people
do not easily fit into the procrustean beds of grand theories . . . . The ‘subjectivity of
society’ means that we start by taking people where they are and as they are.” Id.
115
Laborem Exercens 6, supra note 33, at 358.
116
The notion that man possesses a deep inclination to understand his own
human nature and his particular self does not, of course, originate in Christian
philosophy. As Nozick notes in his discussion of self-identity, the admonition that
humanity engage in a process of introspection appears in philosophical and religious
systems worldwide. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 27 (1981). From
the oracle at Delphi’s charge of “know thyself” to the yogic emphasis on uncovering
our true natures, there has always been a human need for self-knowledge. Id.
117
Laborem Exercens 6, supra note 33, at 359.
118
Id. at 15, at 373.
119
Id.
120
The idea that a worker needs to feel a sense of ownership echoes the concept
of “alienated labor” familiar in the work of Marx. Marx expounded two distinct
forms of alienation confronting the worker. The first is his estrangement from the
product of his labor. MARX, supra note 25, at 324. The idea is that there is a
113
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For many employees this is difficult to achieve since often they are
not the owners of their work product, much less the business itself.
Absent this sense of self-direction, an employee feels anomie, a
121
disconnectedness from the work in which he participates. Catholic
teaching discourages “excessive bureaucratic centralization” because
it suggests to employees that they are just parts of the production
122
process, indistinguishable from the machines they operate.
From this conception of man as the subject and focus of work
123
derives a body of defined rights of workers. In order to achieve the
goals of self-realization and dignity in the workplace, employees are
124
entitled to certain benefits and conditions.
In terms of the employer and his employee, an employer has an
obligation to provide unemployment benefits to those who have lost
125
The basis for this benefit is each person’s right to “life
their jobs.
126
and subsistence.”
It is a moral imperative that the larger
community provide for others in its midst who are in temporary need
127
of assistance.
For those who are employed, an employer must
128
provide a just wage. As Leo XIII first stipulated in Rerum Novarum, a
just wage is not necessarily what the employer and his employee
cognitive dissonance between the worker and the product of his labor. Id. The
product is the embodiment of his labor, yet he feels alienated from it. Id. The
second is his estrangement from the work process itself. Id. at 326. The act of
working somehow estranges the worker from himself. Id. In Marx’s view, “The
estrangement of the object of labor merely summarizes the estrangement, the
alienation in the activity of labor itself.” Id. at 324-26.
121
ERICH FROMM, MARX’S CONCEPT OF MAN 44 (1961).
122
Laborem Exercens 15, supra note 33, at 373.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 18, at 376.
126
Id. at 18, at 377.
127
This is derived from the notion of the common good. Maritain explained this
duty as inherent to the nature of social man. It distinguishes the individual from
society and explains how man seeks individual self-fulfillment and in the process
finds himself serving the common good of the community:
The person as person insists on serving the community and the
common good freely. It insists on this while tending toward its own
fullness, while transcending itself and the community in its movement
toward the transcendent Whole. The person as an individual is
necessarily bound, by constraint if need be, to serve the community
and the common good since it is excelled by them as the part by the
whole.
MARITAIN, supra note 47, at 77.
128
“Just wage” theory has a long tradition in Catholic Social Thought beginning
with Rerum Novarum. For an excellent exposition of just wage theory in the years
immediately following Rerum Novarum in the United States, see the classic JOHN A.
RYAN, A LIVING WAGE (Macmillan 1912).

662

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:641

129

establish by contract. For an employee with family responsibilities,
an acceptable wage is that which allows the needs of the entire family
130
to be met without the other spouse having to work.
In addition,
justice requires that workers have convenient access to health care
(either provided by the State or by the employer) and that this service
131
be easily affordable or free. In a related manner, employees have a
132
Each of
right to a pension as well as insurance during old age.
these enumerated rights is intimately related to the labor union,
which functions to gain these rights and also to maintain them once
133
they are obtained.
Catholic Social Thought upholds the right of workers to form
associations by profession in order to promote their respective
134
interest both in the workplace and in private life. Laborem Exercens
recognizes that unions often occupy an adversarial role as
organizations directly opposed to the interests of managers and
135
owners. But Catholic Social Thought rejects the notion of struggle
between classes that gave rise to the unions of industrialized nations
and instead envisions unions as entities with a unifying mission of
136
building community. Unions legitimately represent the interests of
137
workers, but they are not engaged in “struggle” for its own sake.
Rather, they are vehicles by which workers gain a voice in the
employment context and contribute to a constructive dialogue with
138
employers.
129

Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31.
Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 220.
131
Id. at 218 (noting how in Catholic Social Thought the just wage allows a person
to live in human dignity. Consistent in the encyclicals is the assertion that the wage
must promote more than mere survival. Benefits such as health care and pensions
therefore are firmly rooted in the just wage tradition.).
132
Laborem Exercens 19, supra note 33, at 380.
133
Americans who join labor unions do so for traditional economic reasons
(higher wages, comprehensive benefits), not because they view the union as a means
of participating more meaningfully in the work process. See Margalioth supra note
76, at 145-46. The dramatic decline in the American labor union seems to suggest
that workers do not see unions as integral to the achievement of better working
conditions. Yet in recent times the trend appears to be reversing, particularly among
professionals, a group traditionally not attracted to unionization.
134
Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380-82.
135
Id. at 20, at 380.
136
Rerum Novarum 15, supra note 18, at 20.
137
Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380.
138
Id. The distinction between employees and independent contractors depends
essentially on the degree of control exercised by the employer. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2. In the traditional language of the Restatement, an
employee is “an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the
130
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II: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND VIZCAINO V. MICROSOFT
Under traditional employment law principles, there is a
139
presumption in favor of the employer-employee relationship.
As
Gregory and Leder have observed, the bulk of existing case law
reflects the suspicion with which courts have viewed the employer
who attempts to characterize his staff as “independent contractors”
140
rather than “employees.” Yet despite this presumption, courts have
also looked to the employment contract to determine the rights and
141
obligations governing the relationship. Some courts have relied on
the words of the contract to uphold the employer’s designations of
the worker as an independent contractor, thus denying these people
benefits accorded to similarly situated colleagues whom the employer
142
has classified as “employees.” In a marked departure from many of
its sister circuits, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation refused to rely solely
on the terminology in the contract to determine the plaintiffs’ proper
143
classification. Instead the court utilized the common law employee
doctrine with its traditional analysis of employer control to find the
144
plaintiffs eligible for benefits.
In Vizcaino, the Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) established
145
two classes of workers. The first class was comprised of its “regular

right to control by the master.” Id. § 2(2). The independent contractor, in contrast,
is “a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not
controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his
physical conduct in the performance of his undertaking.” Id. § 2(3). This
distinction is crucial in cases involving an employer’s potential liability to third
parties for injuries caused by an agent. Under principles of respondeat superior, an
employer may be held vicariously liable for the torts committed by those in her
employ. Id. at § 219. As a general rule, the employer is not liable for employees’
tortious conduct outside of the scope of their employment. Id. § 219(2).
Consequently, the employer may avert liability if she proves that the tortfeasor was an
independent contractor and therefore beyond her control.
139
David L. Gregory & William T. Leder, Employee or Independent Contractor?
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation, 47 LAB. L.J. 749 (1996).
140
Id.
141
See Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank, 102 F.3d 1435, 1439-40 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to participate in stock ownership plan
because each had signed an agreement designating them independent contractors).
142
See Sprague v. GM Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (denying plaintiffs
entitlement to benefits because of contractual agreements).
143
97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’d en banc, 120 F.3d 1006 (1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1098 (1998).
144
Id. at 1195, 1200. Thus, in Vizcaino the Ninth Circuit expanded the common
law employee doctrine beyond the tort context to justify the extension of health
benefits etc. to affected employees.
145
Id. at 1189-90.
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employees” who were considered the permanent core of the
146
To these employees Microsoft extended paid
company’s staff.
vacations, sick leave, holidays, short-term disability, group health and
life insurance, pensions, savings benefits under its Savings Plus Plan,
147
and stock options under its Employee Stock Purchase Plan.
The
second class was comprised of temporary agency employees who were
“fully integrated into [its] workforce” and often performed tasks
148
identical to those of the permanent employees.
These “temps”
were entitled to none of the fringe benefits that the regular
149
employees enjoyed. The temps freely contracted with Microsoft to
work as freelancers and from the inception of their employment
150
knew they were not entitled to benefits.
The company informed
the temps that they were responsible for all taxes, insurance, and
151
Subsequently an IRS audit concluded that under the
benefits.
common law the freelancers were employees, and so Microsoft would
have to pay employment taxes and its portion of Federal Insurance
152
Contribution Act (FICA) tax.
The IRS reasoned that because
“Microsoft either exercised, or retained the right to exercise,
direction over the services performed,” it was required to pay the
153
corresponding “employee” taxes.
As a result of this ruling, the
plaintiffs contended that the common law employee doctrine also
entitled them to the benefits Microsoft had denied them by
154
contract.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial
of benefits and remanded the case for determination of individual
155
elegibility for benefits. Most significantly, the court stipulated that
employment status is not controlled by the label assigned to workers
156
In addition, the court rejected Microsoft’s
in their contract.
contention that by treating its temps differently (assigning them
distinct I.D. badges and e-mail addresses, providing them with a less
formal orientation, not inviting them to official company functions,
not paying overtime wages, and paying them through accounts
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 1189.
Id.
Id. at 1190.
Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1189.
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id. at 1190-91.
Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1191.
Id.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1195.
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157

receivable rather than payroll), the company was clearly separating
158
its classes of employees for purposes of benefits. The Ninth Circuit
sent a clear message that contractual language and superficial
distinctions among employees would not suffice to classify some as
159
independent contractors and deny them employee benefits.
Vizcaino sparked considerable controversy on both sides of the
issue. One view wholly rejects the Ninth Circuit’s allowance of
common law employee considerations to affect the classification of
160
employees. This theory embraces laissez-faire market capitalism and
necessarily views the Vizcaino decision as a threat to the integrity of
contract and the freedom of autonomous actors to direct their lives
161
in their own self-interest.
Its proponents view the Vizcaino court’s
approach as tantamount to ignoring the parties’ intentions and, in
162
the process, undermining principles of contract.
This view argues
that courts should not presume to understand the customs of the
163
industry in which these arrangements are made. For example, the
computer industry is unpredictable and companies rely on
independent contractors both to easily fill needs as they arise and to
164
reduce staff as required. From this angle, the court interfered with
165
the efficient market response to fluctuating demand.
For the practitioner advising an employer-client, Vizcaino
suggests that the law on independent contractors is sufficiently in a
state of flux such that employers need to be careful in classifying their
166
staff.
It is suggested that Vizcaino is a dramatic example of a
growing trend by “courts and administrative agencies . . . to prevent
employers classifying workers so as to avoid legal liabilities and

157

Id. at 1190.
Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1195, n.9.
159
Id. at 1195:
We have no doubt that the company did not intend to provide
freelancers or independent contractors with employee benefits, and
that if the plaintiffs had in fact been freelancers or independent
contractors, they would not be eligible under the plan. The plaintiffs,
however, were not freelancers or independent contractors. They were
common law employees . . . .
160
See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
161
Kellogg, supra note 2, at 1779 (noting that “the Ninth Circuit showed a
disturbing eagerness to recast the employment relationship from the beginning . . . .
The Ninth Circuit ignored contractual agreements to the contrary.”).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 1802.
165
Id. at 1802-03.
166
Coskey, supra note 5, at 91.
158
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167

responsibilities.”
The employer is cautioned to avoid the
retroactive financial burdens of having a court determine that its staff
168
are common law employees. As Microsoft did following the Vizcaino
ruling, employers often resort to hiring freelance employees through
169
The agency then becomes responsible for payroll
temp agencies.
170
services and withholding of federal taxes. It is not clear whether in
doing so the employer protects itself from liability under other
171
At the very least it is reasonable to expect that
employment laws.
employers after Vizcaino will take two courses of action: hire from
temporary agencies and take even stronger steps to distinguish
workers for whom they will provide benefits and those for whom they
will not. Each of these practices has dramatically impacted the
workplace and employment law.
A. The Temp Agency as a Means of Reducing Control
Employers utilize temp agencies in an attempt to lessen their
degree of control over certain employees and thereby avoid certain
172
legal obligations.
These agencies assume a significant portion of
the obligations formerly carried out by the on-site employer, such as
payment of salary, withholding of taxes, and other duties mandated
173
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). By transferring these
responsibilities to the temporary employment agency, the user
employer essentially designates the agency as the “employer” and
thereby avoids the serious financial liabilities associated with having a
court determine that the contingent workforce are common law
174
employees. Such a legal arrangement, however, is premised on an
instrumental conception of the employee.
The employee is
167

Id. at 92.
Id.
169
Gregory & Leder, supra note 139, at 753.
170
Id.
171
Id. For example, what is the employer’s obligation in terms of workers’
compensation, the NLRA, anti-discrimination laws, and FMLA provisions?
172
As George Gonos has noted, the employer’s use of the temp agency:
effectively severs the employer-employee relationship between workers
and those user-firms on whose premises they work and for whom they
provide needed labor input. That is, this arrangement allows the
[temporary help firm’s] client to utilize labor without taking on the
specific social, legal, and contractual obligations that since the New
Deal have been attached to employer status . . . .
Professor George Gonos, The Battle Over ‘Employer’ Status in the Post-War U.S. : The Case
of the Temporary Help Firm, Address Before the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association 6 (June 1995) (on file with author).
173
Id. at 8.
174
Coskey, supra note 5, at 96.
168
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indistinguishable from production capital and ought to be
manipulated to meet narrow business goals: greater productivity and
175
lesser costs.
There is little, if any, consideration of the resulting
176
These
adverse consequences to the temporary employees.
consequences range from the employee feeling that he is expendable
and not integral to the job, to the arbitrary denial of employment
benefits to contingent workers who do exactly the same work as their
177
permanent colleagues.
Recent developments in employment law,
however, strongly suggest that employers may find it more difficult to
use the temp agency artifice to sidestep the issue of contingent
178
workers’ rights.
B. Joint Employer Doctrine and Evolving Rights of Temporary
Employees
As discussed above, when a user-employer hires its nonpermanent staff from a temporary agency, it attempts to assign
179
“employer” status to the agency.
In addition to avoiding certain
financial obligations, the employer also endeavors to circumvent the
180
concomitant obligation to collectively bargain with its staff. In the
175

Ness, supra note 1, at 4.
Even the language used by management representatives reflects a purely
rational, business-model approach to the utilization of labor. In a recent report from
the American Management Association, a representative of that organization used
this familiar jargon to advise companies on making productive use of the contingent
worker tool:
[t]hese [Staffing and Structure] surveys show us the importance of
approaching staffing issues from a strategic viewpoint. As companies try
harder and harder to reap efficiencies and competitive advantage from
their organizational structures the sophisticated and strategic use of a
variety of staffing solutions, from temporary workers and outsourcing,
to full-time hires, will become essential. Companies should be
schooled and ready to capitalize on the variety of options at their
disposal.
Need for Talent and Flexibility, Not Cost Savings, Drive Hiring of Contingent Workers, AMA
UPDATE (Am. Mgmt. Ass’n., New York, N.Y.), July 18, 2000, at 3 (emphasis added).
177
For a general account of this phenomenon and the efforts of temp advocates
to institute concrete changes in the temp industry’s employment practices, see
Bernstein, supra note 13, at 102. One specific measure is a code of conduct
governing the temporary agencies’ practices. The code would require, among other
things, that temps receive adequate training for their assignments. Id. at 102-03. It
would also encourage companies to convert temps into permanent employees by
abolishing the fee typically paid by the hiring company for such conversions. Id. at
103.
178
See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
179
See supra note 155.
180
Richard Posthuma & James B. Dworkin, The Joint Employer, the NLRB, and
Changing Rights for Contingent Workers, 90 LAB. L.J. 19, 20 (1997).
176
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context of the contingent workforce, this added advantage ensures
that the user-employer will not have to formally negotiate with
workers over the inevitable wage and benefit grievances that will
181
arise.
Under the joint employer doctrine, however, the law provides
that an employee may have two employers for collective bargaining
182
purposes.
Joint employers are “two or more clearly distinct firms
that share the authority to determine the terms and conditions of
employment of specified employees. The firms do not have to be
jointly owned, operated, or controlled to be designated joint
183
employers.” This has the potential, of course, to expand contingent
workers’ rights of representation under traditional labor law. The
user–employer, therefore, may be considered a joint employer with
the temporary employment agency if “there are sufficient facts to
show that one employer essentially controls the labor relations of
184
This returns us to a control analysis similar to the one
another.”
ratified by the Vizcaino court to find that the plaintiffs were employees
185
entitled to benefits. In other words, despite the involvement of the
temporary employment agency, the question is whether the user–
employer still exercises control over the employees in the workplace
sufficient to make it a joint employer. As a joint employer, the
company would not be permitted to sever its legal bonds
186
completely.
Its power to make unilateral decisions regarding
employment conditions would be significantly reduced if collective
187
Notwithstanding evidence of
bargaining duties are imposed.
control, until recently the employer could still avoid collective

181

Thus the already tenuous connection between the contingent worker and his
work environment is compounded by the law’s protection of the employer’s right to
refuse to engage in constructive dialogue with the temporary staff. Prior to August
2000, the NLRB did not extend collective bargaining rights under the NLRA to any
class of temporary worker. See Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, Winning Union
Representation for Temps, 4 WORKINGUSA 37, 38-39 (2000-01). The alienation of the
temporary worker, therefore, has a two-fold source: the first is the measures taken by
the employer to separate out the temp so as to avoid the adverse consequences of a
court’s finding of control. The second is the legal barriers denying the temp the
right to assume a more active role in the workplace culture.
182
Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 20.
183
Id. (distinguishing the joint employer doctrine from the single employer and
alter ego doctrine).
184
Id.
185
Vizcaino, supra note 143, at 1191-92.
186
Specifically, the user-employer would have to bargain over a contract
termination with the temp agency. The employer may also be subject to laws
governing unfair labor practices. Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 23.
187
Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 23.
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bargaining with his temporary employees under the NLRA.
The joint employer doctrine requires not only that the element
of control be satisfied, but also that the employer consents to collective
189
bargaining with the employees of a temporary agency.
This
requirement, commonly referred to as the Greenhoot consent rule,
rendered virtually irrelevant the finding of control by the employer
190
over the temporary employees.
Greenhoot assured the employer
that, simply by withholding its consent, it could avoid answering for
191
its employment practices at the bargaining table.
This aided in
maintaining the adversarial paradigm that has traditionally
192
characterized the employer/employee relationship.
Recognizing
that the Greenhoot consent rule may be denying contingent workers
the representation rights contemplated by the NLRA, the NLRB
193
revisited the rule recently in M.B. Sturgis, Inc.
In M.B. Sturgis, the Board significantly refined Greenhoot to allow
temporary workers who are jointly employed to form a bargaining
unit with permanent employees without the consent of the
194
employers.
The Board first noted that under Section 9(b) of the
NLRA, it had the authority to examine novel employment
arrangements to ensure that employees had the “fullest freedom in
195
exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act.”
M.B. Sturgis
employed thirty-four to thirty-five permanent employees and ten to

188

The recently decided case M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B 440 (2000), has
significantly altered the potential bargaining rights of temporary workers. See infra
note 207 and accompanying text.
189
Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973)
190
Posthuma and Dworkin have astutely observed that the Greenhoot consent rule
effectively denied contingent workers any substantive bargaining rights:
The irony . . . is that the more control the user-employer exercises over
the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of
temporary workers, the greater the likelihood that it will be deemed a
joint employer, and thus have the right to refuse to bargain with the
temporary workers. This situation has led some to conclude that
temporary employees have virtually no protection under the NLRA.
See supra note 180, at 22.
191
Id. at 23.
192
Theodore Eisenberg, The Price of Protection, 148 N.J. L.J. 117 (1997) (noting the
need for organized labor to improve upon the adversarial model in order to facilitate
management-labor cooperation).
193
M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 440 (2000)
194
Id.
195
Id. at 448 (quoting the following from Section 9(b) of the NLRA.: “The Board
shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof.”).
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fifteen temporary agency employees at its flexible gas hose
196
Although the agency hired the temps,
manufacturing plant.
determined their wages and benefits, and paid them their salaries,
the temps “work[ed] side-by-side with Sturgis’ employees,
perform[ed] the same work, and were subject[ed] to the same
197
supervision.”
When the temporary employees sought to join the
same collective bargaining unit as the Sturgis employees, the
Regional Director of the NLRB excluded them, reasoning that since
they were jointly employed, the consent of both employers was
198
Since the agency
required to include the temporary employees.
had not given its consent, the temps’ inclusion in the bargaining unit
199
was barred.
The Board reversed the decision on the ground that the
requirement of consent under the joint employer doctrine was not
200
proper in the M.B. Sturgis context. In the Board’s opinion, Section
9(b) contemplates a bargaining unit consisting of “all of an
201
employer’s employees or a subgroup of such employees.”
Furthermore, consent is not required for employees to gain
202
The Board then
representation in an employer-wide unit.
determined that a bargaining unit consisting of regular and
temporary employees must only meet the community of interest
203
test. In applying the community of interest test, the Board opined
that the test establishes “whether a mutuality of interests in wages,
hours, and working conditions exists among the employees
204
involved.”
The test would likely be satisfied where employees
worked together in the same environment, with identical supervisors,
205
and under similar conditions.
The Board ultimately decided that
the contingent employees in M.B. Sturgis shared a community of
interest with their permanent colleagues and did not need employer
206
consent to join the bargaining unit.
The decision correctly recognized that the Greenhoot consent
requirement needed to be reinterpreted in the case of contingent
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at 443.
Id.
M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
Id.
M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 453.
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employment. The consent requirement had become arbitrary in
work
environments
where
temporary
employees
were
indistinguishable from permanent workers in terms of wages,
functions, supervisors, and expectations. With this modification of
the consent rule, the employer’s bargaining obligations will be solely
a function of whether the user-employer is a joint employer, thus
207
making it easier for unions to organize temporary workers.
The
M.B. Sturgis decision, however, is not without its potentially negative
ramifications, particularly employers’ decisions to terminate
temporary positions rather than extend costly bargaining rights to
208
those employees.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the issue of contingent
workers is a complex one involving valid competing claims from both
the employer and employee. Each side presents its position as
grounded in certain rights: for the employer, it is the right to
contract for employees who are willing to fill a need for less total
compensation; for the employee it is the right to earn a living wage
209
and receive treatment equal to his permanent colleagues.
The
ultimate resolution to this question and the legal framework we
subsequently adopt must not only satisfy sound legal principle, but
must also be morally acceptable. A morally justifiable regime is one
210
that respects individual rights but also promotes human dignity.
Rights are not unqualified; they are not to be exercised without
207
208

Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 26.
Id. Posthuma and Dworkin argue that:
[w]e may see employers reduce the control they exercise over
temporary employees to insure that they do not expose themselves to a
bargaining obligation as a joint employer. User employers may be
forced to carefully tailor their relationships with temp help agencies to
show that they do not exercise control over the temp workers. As they
tailor their relationships to reduce control, they may also reduce their
flexibility in handling temporary workers . . . This could mean that
some user employers would reduce their reliance on temporary
workers, and consequently reduce the number of temp jobs available.

Id.
209

See Cook, supra note 11, at 16, quoting a representative of the American
Staffing Association regarding employers’ rights in the contingent employment
context:
[e]mployers ought to be free to say ‘we’re going to provide coverage to
this group of workers and not to that group of workers . . .’ Although it
may strike some people as arbitrary or unfair, the law currently allows
them to do that, for reasons that don’t have to be justified.
210
Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (Joy and Hope: Pastoral Constitution on
the Church in the Modern World) (1965) 29, reprinted in The Documents of Vatican II
228 (Walter M. Abbott S.J. ed. & Very Rev. Msgr. Joseph L. Gallagher trans., 1966)
(acknowledging that while human institutions must “safeguard the basic rights of
man,” they must also “minister to the dignity and purpose of man”).
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regard for the common good. What is in the best interest of society
cannot be determined until we can ascertain what is in the best
211
interest of man individually.
Catholic Social Thought is very wellsituated to appraise the evolving social condition of man because it
has developed over time a consistent philosophy of human nature
212
and the kind of society that allows that nature to flourish.
III: CONTINGENT EMPLOYMENT UNDER CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
Underlying the issue of contingent work are competing theories
213
214
of individualism and communitarianism. The individualist theory
tends to frame the issue as an employment arrangement freely
215
chosen by the parties and established in contract. Parties enter into
contract to secure for themselves what they believe is an advantage of
216
some sort.
The State and its laws are not to interfere
paternalistically with these arrangements, but to defend vigorously
the rights of individuals to use the contract as a means of achieving
217
their own personally-defined happiness.
By contrast, the
211

Id. at 25, at 224 (noting that the human person is the focus of social life, and
that all institutions exist to serve man).
212
Id. at 10, at 208 (“The Church believes that Christ . . . can through His Spirit
offer man the light and the strength to measure up to his supreme destiny . . . The
Church also maintains that beneath all changes there are many realities which do
not change . . . .”).
213
“Individualism” as used in this article refers to the ethos whereby citizens
determine for themselves what the good life is and expect the law to “afford all
lifestyles and belief systems equal treatment.” See Kenneth L. Grasso, Introduction:
Catholic Social Thought and the Quest for An American Public Philosophy, in CATHOLICISM,
LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM 3 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995) (“The
state exists simply to make public arrangements designed to secure individuals the
greatest possible amount of freedom to lead their lives in the way they choose
consistent with the exercise of that freedom by others.”).
214
“Communitarianism” refers to precepts similar to those embodied in the
Preamble to the Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, among
which are the recognition “[o]f individual human dignity and the social dimension
of human existence . . . that communities and politics have obligations . . . to foster
participation and deliberation in social and political life, of the social side of human
nature; the responsibilities that must be borne by citizens, individually and
collectively, in a regime of rights . . . .” See THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER
xxv (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998).
215
Kellogg, supra note 2, at 1795.
216
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2 (1981) (noting that “[t]he law of
contracts facilitates our disposing of [these] rights on terms that seem best to us.
The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions individuals make of their
rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have
rights”).
217
Id. Professor Fried observes that in the last fifty years this notion of contractual
obligation as “essentially self-imposed” is not as unquestioned as it once was. It may
be argued, he notes, that “intermediate institutions,” such as the state, the union,
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communitarian ethic asks whether the social or legal regime
promotes individual human dignity by allowing individuals to
218
contribute to “sustainable forms of community life.”
It actively
219
and
promotes “the social dimension of human existence,”
recognizes that a flourishing society consists not in a ruthless pursuit
of self-gratification, but in personal fulfillment achieved in
220
community. The communitarian strand in Catholic Social Thought
recognizes that we each contribute to the health of a reality greater
than ourselves and, in turn, are personally enriched by our
221
participation therein.
The notion that the human person has a need for development
in society is firmly established. According to Aristotle, man is by
nature a social being who forms a variety of associations, including
families, neighborhoods, and cities, to accomplish a good of which he
222
is incapable alone. During his nineteenth century tour of America,
Tocqueville observed similarly that one of the most distinguishing
features of our society was its propensity to form associations for a
223
variety of purposes.
He observed that voluntary associations are
essential in a democratic society because individually men are
224
powerless to accomplish their goals.
These communities were
225
united by popular adherence to an “agreed-upon set of norms.” St.
and the corporation have reduced man’s individual capacity overall for unfettered
contract formation. The argument, therefore, that the Vizcaino court’s decision is an
affront to the integrity of contract seems somewhat disingenuous.
218
TAM, supra note 77, at 7 (listing three central communitarian principles: 1. A
society’s determinations of what is “true’ can only be made by cooperative enquiry.
2. The responsibilities of individual members of society can be based only on
common values as determined by the community. 3. Society must be re-structured to
allow all citizens equal participation in deciding how power will be exercised over
them).
219
See supra note 192.
220
See TAM, supra note 77, at 7.
221
Gaudium et Spes 25, supra note 210, at 224.
222
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS at B.
223
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1984).
224
Id. at 107. Tocqueville even proposed that “civilization itself would be
endangered” if human beings did not cultivate the habit of forming associations. Id.
This is because a society that prevented its citizens from banding together to
accomplish “great things” would necessarily devolve into “barbarism.” Id. Most
tellingly, Tocqueville warned that “[i]f men are to remain civilized or to become so,
the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the
equality of conditions is increased.” Id. at 110. He seems to be suggesting that a
culture which strives for social equality must simultaneously encourage the formation
of civic associations or it will fail.
225
Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism:
Images Romantic and Real, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 683, 689 (1997) (describing the
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Thomas Aquinas, the philosopher whose political theory underlies
Catholic Social Thought, asserted that without social interaction man
226
may live, but he may not live well.
Likewise in the encyclical
Gaudium et Spes, the Church echoed the sentiment: “Man’s social
nature makes it evident that the progress of the human person and
227
the advance of society itself hinge on each other.”
Our work environments then should also reflect this profound
social instinct in man. The most obvious manifestation of employees
coming together in a cooperative venture is the labor union.
Without some effective means of addressing workplace issues, the
contingent employee can expect less take-home pay, less health
228
insurance, less retirement benefits, and less legal protection. Yet an
individual employee protesting these inequities risks discharge when
he raises the issue with his employer. The freedom to associate and
form groups based on shared interests and common concerns is an
essential right. This is one of the most vital elements in the Catholic
tradition because it represents the confluence of various integral
principles: that man possesses an important social inclination; that
this social nature requires man to rise above his weakness in pursuing
a narrow individualism at the expense of the common good; that in
the tradition of subsidiarity, people are called to collectively resolve
their disputes. Contingent workers must be permitted to exercise
their right of association at work. In language reminiscent of Leo
XIII, the NLRB in M.B. Sturgis, Inc. decided that the temporary
workers could not be denied collective bargaining rights because they
shared a “community of interest” with their permanent colleagues.
The community of interest standard is an implicit recognition of the

classical notion of community as “a small, bounded, voluntary association,
intermediate between the individual and the state, brought into being with a limited
social agenda”).
226
Aquinas posited two reasons for man’s involvement in social life: The first is for
the furnishment of necessities and the second is for the moral development that
allows for a higher form of existence, which is achieved through civic involvement.
See VERNON J. BOURKE, THE POCKET AQUINAS 232 (1960).
227
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 210, at 224.
228
See Cook, supra note 11, at 15, citing the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ findings
that:
[contingent workers] take home nearly $100 less per week than their
nominally permanent counterparts . . . 20% of contingent workers
receive employer health insurance, compared with more than 50% of
noncontingent workers . . . one-fourth of contingent workers are
eligible for employer pension plans, while nearly half of permanent
workers qualify. Perhaps most significantly, the vast majority of
contingents fall through vast loopholes in worker-protection laws . . . .
Id.
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right of people similarly situated to form associations. This does not
necessarily mean that contingent workers have no place in the
economy. It does mean, however, that employers may not use
“temporary” workers in a permanent capacity without extending to
these workers the same benefits accorded permanent employees.
Rather than imposing a blanket rule for the treatment of
contingent workers, the NLRB opened the channels for these
workers to participate in crafting policies that will affect them
personally. In the best tradition of subsidiarity, the accretion of
temps into existing bargaining units maintains decision-making at the
level of the workplace community. The temp unions that may result
from this decision will only promote efficiency and equity in the
context of dispute resolution. Bargaining as a unified voice,
contingent workers can freely and openly discuss grievances and help
to craft joint-solutions without fear of reprisals. The result is an
arrangement respecting the equal dignity of all parties concerned.
Catholic Social Thought has always called for a “family wage,” and
this consists of a just remuneration for work done and benefits
229
necessary to maintain family life. Because of his legal classification,
the law permits the temporary employee to work without these
benefits. It is morally unjustifiable to contend, as free-market
advocates do, that the price at which labor is bought is rightly
230
determined by the forces of supply and demand.
From the perspective of the individual contingent worker, a
more participatory work environment respects his or her dignity as an
independent moral agent. It engages directly the subjective aspect of
work and actively opposes the instrumentalist view of the worker that
is so prevalent currently. The degradation of the contingent worker
that is the result of employers paying substandard wages and reduced
benefits is directly linked to our culture’s over-emphasis on the
231
objective aspect of labor. Though there do appear to be some signs
232
of change, a view persists that labor is the property of the employer
229

Laborem Exercens, supra note 33, at 379.
Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 213. Lamoureux notes that market forces are
not suited to set a just wage because “it ignores the fact that the laborer must work in
order to live; that is, the employer is free to offer a substandard wage and can
arbitrarily offer or withhold work. The employee, however, is constrained by need to
accept whatever is offered or go without work.” Id.; see also YATES, supra note 37, at 10
(“We [workers] have only our ability to work to sell, but they [management] have the
jobs . . . . It is a simple but powerful truth that working people and their employers
do not face each other as equals . . . workers are replaceable.”
231
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
232
See STUDS TERKEL, WORKING at xii (Pantheon Books 1974) (1972): as early as
thirty years ago the author noted that young Americans were questioning the
230
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233

objectified as the means of producing profit. Work becomes merely
234
Once
the process by which business tasks are accomplished.
employees are objectified in this manner, it is not difficult to
understand why companies vigorously defend the independent
235
contractor doctrine as a cost-effective measure.
The Catholic
emphasis on the dual nature of human labor, the objective and
subjective, is a powerful challenge to the market liberal ideal. The
subjective conception of work elucidated in Laborem Exercens, that all
work aids man in the process of self-realization, casts serious doubt on
the contingent employment proposal. In the subjective analysis, the
temporary employee is not a factor in production, but “a conscious
236
and free subject who decides about himself.” It restores a real sense
of dignity to all work because it is performed by human beings, who
237
are the source and measure of human dignity. And as the human
creations of God, the temporary employee is endowed with a human
238
nature and from this nature spring certain definite natural rights.
The Vizcaino decision recognized an important principle of
239
justice; namely, that equal work deserves equal compensation.
By
using the common law employee doctrine, the Ninth Circuit was able
to give this principle effect at the Microsoft Corporation. Yet instead
of placing the temporary and regular employees in a comparable
position, the decision paradoxically created a more fractured and
segregated work environment. Rather than risk the same fate as
Microsoft, employers have taken even bolder steps to separate
240
permanent workers from temporary employees.
The workplace is
prevailing work ethic that one’s job was obligatory with no guarantee of personal
fulfillment.
233
For a spirited attack of this view, see YATES, supra note 37, at 19-20, discussing
the tendency of companies to reduce employees to another cost of production akin
to a tool or machine.
234
Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 358.
235
Ness, supra note 1, at 4.
236
Laborem Exercens, supra note 33, at 358.
237
Id. at 364.
238
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1956 (Doubleday 1995) (“The natural
law, present in the heart of each man and established by reason, is universal in its
precepts and its authority extends to all men. It expresses the dignity of the person
and determines the basis for his fundamental rights and duties.”) (quoting Cicero’s
De Republica III).
239
Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 224 (noting that in the American context
Catholic just wage theory has been influential in securing greater rights for women
in the workplace. For example, the National Council of Catholic Women urged
legislatures to enact laws regarding “minimum wages, limitations on hours, equal pay
for equal work, overtime pay, pension, and maternity benefits.”).
240
Forster, supra note 3, at 555-56 (noting that employers have gone so far as to
require contingent workers to wear distinctive badges, to refuse to invite them to

2003

COMMENT

677

less a cooperative environment than it is a disjointed collection of
discrete groups discouraged from associating with one another. It
must be remembered that these groups often are doing the same jobs
under the same supervisors. By virtue of these similarities, the
permanent and temporary workers share job-related interests and
concerns, yet worker solidarity and the resulting associations and
groups are conspicuously absent.
The issue of contingent work reminds us that law has a moral
241
dimension.
While law and morality may operate in theoretically
distinct spheres, their related function as shapers of human conduct
242
inevitably leads to conflict.
Often the law stirs deep moral
resentment when it supports or maintains structures that do not
243
comport with one’s moral sense, however one may define it. Yet a
legal regime that does not reinforce a society’s moral sentiment risks
its legitimacy and consequently the citizens’ adherence to its
244
precepts.
This Comment has proceeded from this very premise,
company social gatherings, and to disallow them from using company parking lots).
241
DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 57 (1964) (noting that law and morality share
common concerns. Both “are concerned to impose certain standards of conduct
without which human society would hardly survive and, in many of these
fundamental standards, law and morality reinforce and supplement each other as
part of the fabric of social life.”).
242
Id. at 67-69 (positing that there are three theoretical responses to conflicts
between the positive law and and the moral law: 1. the Judeo-Christian response
essentially denies any conflict because “the moral law dictates the actual content of
human law.” Id. at 68. For the medieval Scholastic philosopher, this is akin to the
notion of human law as derivative of the natural law, which in turn descends from
the divine law. See St. Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on Law Questions 90-97, in ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 44-54 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1988). 2. The
Hegelian/Hobbesian response resolves any apparent divergence by collapsing law
and morality into one. Thus, man’s moral obligation is simply to obey the law. Id. at
68. In this view, the distinction between just and unjust laws is an unwarranted one
since law is inherently just and deserving of the people’s obeisance. Id. at 3. The
legal positivist response acknowledges no conflict because law and morality are
conceptually distinct and therefore one is incompetent to critique the other. Id. at
69. As a means of critique, a moral system is able to evaluate only other moral
systems using common moral criteria. Id. The same holds true for legal systems. Id.
Most importantly, “neither can resolve questions of validity save in its own sphere.”
Id. In practical terms, morality is in no position to judge law and law is incapable of
evaluating morality. Each makes no sense outside of its own domain. Id. To the
legal positivist, therefore, the application of Catholic moral principles to
labor/employment law is fundamentally incongruous.
243
See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (treating
generally the seemingly intractable issue of abortion in American society). Tribe
notes, for example, the vigorous reaction to Roe v. Wade of the Catholic Church and
the subsequent rise of the Catholic right-to-life movement. Id. at 143.
244
LLOYD, supra note 241, at 32 (“For without such [legitimacy] . . . the automatic
and impersonal operation of legal authority would cease to function and would be
replaced by anarchy and disorder.”); see also Introduction to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES

678

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:641

and has proposed Catholic social principles as the moral system
against which the law relating to contingent employment is to be
measured.
Catholic Social Thought is a powerful tool in the transformation
of workplace culture. Its consistent emphasis on the dignity of
individuals and the unique nature of man strikes at the core of the
contingent worker problem. At its root, the philosophy underlying
contingent employment offends man in his individual and social
disposition. Catholic Social Thought advances the issue beyond mere
freedom of contract and business necessity.
It provides an
independent standard that promises to elevate the issue from
245
competing employer/employee rights to objective human rights.
The application of Catholic Social Thought would achieve
harmony between management and employees because it would
promote a cooperative model of labor relations. The adversarial
model that has marked employment arrangements for so long would
cede to a more collaborative practice. Recognizing that each side
shares in the responsibility of creating an environment that is both
productive and human, employers and temporary workers will
respect each other individually and work for a system that not only
gets the job done, but respects people in the process.
In addition, Catholic Social Thought will return to labor its
246
inherent worth and dignity.
Its comprehensive labor theory
reminds us that ultimately work does not define man. Man is not
deserving of more or less respect by virtue of his job status.
Therefore, any attempts to draw hierarchical distinctions between
workers for purposes of employment benefits would be suspect. The
temporary nature of some contingent employment and the nominal
distinction between “temporary” and “permanent” employees, for
example, are not grounds for disparate treatment. This would give
pause to employers utilizing contingent workers as a means of
lowering costs.
Catholic Social Thought actively opposes our culture’s
preoccupation with work as the defining element of our lives. It
restores to work its proper role as a means of subsistence and a
ON LEGAL THOUGHT xix (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) (noting that “[i]t is
important for a free people to connect the positive law to their ideals of a higher
good. Unless they perceive such a connection, the people will resist compliance with
the law, and the state will be forced to turn to naked coercion.”).
245
Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380 (cautioning that unions should be
formed not merely to “struggle ‘against’ others,” but to further the aims of “social
justice”).
246
Id. at 9, at 363-64.
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contributing (though not defining) element of our personhood. In
the context of contingent work, the terms of employment cannot be
justified simply by reference to a contract “freely made” between
247
employer and employee.
The employer would recognize that in
addition to work, the contingent employee has obligations to himself,
family, and community. The employee meets these obligations in
large part because his job does not require excessive hours with
minimal pay. Under Catholic Social Thought, employers are called
upon to recognize these fundamental commitments and to refrain
from imposing onerous conditions that detract from these
responsibilities. In concrete terms, the contingent worker would
248
earn a “living wage,” enabling him to sustain the well-being of his
family and contribute to the health of his community either through
financial means or by donation of time.
Furthermore, a vital contribution of Catholic Social Thought to
249
the transformation of work is its emphasis on the labor union. One
of the most significant hindrances to improving the conditions of
contingent employees has been the law’s reluctance to afford
250
collective bargaining rights to temps.
Under Catholic Social
Thought, temps would have the freedom to form unions in order to
propose creative, group-formulated solutions to workplace issues. In
so doing, temps would satisfy the deep social instinct of people to
251
associate according to common interests and desires.
The
fraternity of the union would thus aid in the process of individual
self-realization as well as promote a more cooperative and
252
representative workplace. M.B. Sturgis is an encouraging sign that
labor law is beginning to acknowledge the important role of the
union in creating just working conditions.
Finally, Catholic Social Thought would eradicate the very
foundation that gave rise to the contingent worker phenomenon—
247

Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31.
Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 219 (“A laborer’s right to a living wage is the
concrete expression of the general right that inheres in all people to obtain in a
reasonable way as much of the common bounty of nature required to enable the
laborer to maintain a decent livelihood.”).
249
Rerum Novarum 36, supra note 18, at 33; see also Laborem Exercens 20, supra note
33, at 380.
250
See Chirag & Mehta, supra note 181, at 38-39.
251
Rerum Novarum 38, supra note 18, at 33 (noting that both the state and the
union have identical premises; namely, “the natural propensity of man to live in
society”).
252
Economic Justice For All 304, supra note 43, at 648 (describing the purpose of
unions as “enabl[ing] workers to make positive and creative contributions to the
firm, the community, and the larger society in an organized and cooperative way”).
248
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the objectification of work.
It would restore man as “the proper
subject of work” and strive to create an environment where work has
deeper subjective meaning. The contingent worker, therefore, would
no longer be simply a cost-effective means of getting the job done,
but a free human being seeking fulfillment in his work and a sense of
ownership in the process.
Mindful of these considerations,
employers would be more likely to create environments where
employee input is welcome and job satisfaction is valued.
CONCLUSION
The rights of contingent workers represents one of the most
pressing labor and employment issues of the day. These workers are
among the most vulnerable in the workforce because the law provides
them with few protections. Unsurprisingly, employers are adamant
that the contingent worker is an indispensable tool in the evolving
labor market. By utilizing temporary employees, the employer cuts
costs through reduced salaries and benefits. He also achieves
maximum flexibility because he can hire and fire as demand requires
with relatively slight legal consequences.
These boons for
management, however, often come at great cost to the contingent
employee.
Less take-home pay, often non-existent benefits,
alienation in the workplace, and decreased job security are just a few
of the drawbacks. Management’s asserted right to make strategic use
of human labor and employees’ claims to certain minimal guarantees
appear irreconcilable. What is required is a profound transformation
of the culture of work: a more balanced view that envisions labor not
as an instrumentality to be effectively exploited, but as a deeply
human activity that sanctifies as it creates. Only then will man cease
to be the object of work and instead become the subject, the one who
labors for himself and thereby truly participates in the ongoing
process of creation.

253

Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 358.

